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architecture of the international investment protection and investor-
state dispute settlement regime. Second, it explains that international 
investment agreements (IIAs) may be used as a way for developing 
countries to make credible commitments to liberal economic and trade 
policies in order to attract foreign investment and then considers 
four different critical approaches to investment arbitration as a 
system of global governance: (i) hegemonic international law, (ii) new 
constitutionalism, (iii) global administrative law, and (iv) humanity’s 
law. Third, it gives a brief overview of cases where an investor 
was allegedly harassed or mistreated in the context of a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. Finally, it concludes that investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS), as a form of global governance, allows 
private arbitral tribunals to review the inherently public function of 
criminal law in sovereign states. Consequently, private arbitral review 
of public functions may have long-reaching implications for state 
sovereignty and democratic accountability. 
I 
THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
Legal practitioners and academic commentators usually define 
arbitration as a private and consensual dispute resolution system where 
two or more parties agree to submit their current or possible future 
dispute to a neutral third party (either an individual or a panel of 
several individuals) whose decision will be final and binding on 
the parties, subject to limited judicial review.1 The objectives of 
international arbitration agreements are multifold and include: 
providing a neutral and centralized dispute resolution forum, freeing 
the parties from the influence of their respective national governments, 
avoiding jurisdictional complications accompanying international civil 
litigation, ensuring enforceability of awards, benefiting from the 
commercial competence and expertise of the tribunal, avoiding lengthy 
appeals, tailoring the dispute resolution procedure to the parties’ 
needs, increasing speed and reducing costs of dispute resolution, 
ensuring confidentiality during the proceedings, facilitating amicable 
settlements, and removing concerns about state immunity and the 
partiality of state courts in disputes involving states and state entities.2 
1 NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
¶¶ 1.04–.05 (6th ed. 2015). 
2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 73–93 (2d ed. 2014). 
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While lawyers and legal scholars predominantly view international 
arbitration as a private, consensual, and nonpolitical system for 
resolution of economic disputes, some international relations and 
law and society scholars argue that the proliferation of international 
arbitration removes politically sensitive matters from public 
supervision and judicial oversight.3 National governments increasingly 
embrace the idea of allowing arbitration of claims arising out of 
concession and public-private partnership agreements, government 
procurement, and licensing, as well as disputes involving allegations of 
antitrust violations, bribery, corruption, or fraud.4 According to these 
scholars, such an “expansion of arbitrable subject-matter, when 
combined with the secretive, closed, and highly discretionary and 
informal nature of international commercial arbitration, forms a 
powerful challenge to democratically accountable institutions.”5 In this 
regard, the rise of ISDS—a system that allows foreign investors to 
arbitrate their claims in international tribunals without recourse to 
domestic courts—is of particular concern. 
Depending on the source of state consent, international investment 
arbitration may be contract-based, statute-based, or treaty-based.6 
A sovereign state may give consent to have its disputes with foreign 
investors arbitrated either (i) directly in a contract (for instance, in an 
investment, joint venture, production sharing, or concession 
agreement) concluded with an individual foreign investor; (ii) in 
national legislation governing foreign investment; or (iii) in an 
international investment agreement (IIA) concluded between two or 
more states. 
A web of numerous IIAs, including bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and other treaties with investment provisions (TIPs), such as 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) 
containing investment chapters, provide a fertile ground for the 
3 See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 26–29 (2003). 
4 See Karim Abou Youssef, The Death of Inarbitrability, in ARBITRABILITY: 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 47, 47 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros 
Brekoulakis eds., 2009). 
5 CUTLER, supra note 3, at 223. 
6 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 254–60 (2d ed. 2012); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 44–46 (2009). 
For more on international investment arbitration see CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶¶ 2.76–.88, 
3.41–.49 (2d ed. 2017). 
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proliferation of international treaty-based investment arbitrations. In 
2018, forty new IIAs were concluded (thirty BITs and ten TIPs), 
bringing the total number of IIAs to 3,317 (2,932 BITs and 385 TIPs) 
by the end of the year.7 In particular, the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the 
Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) were signed on 
March 8, 2018, and November 30, 2018, respectively.8 
Usually, IIAs contain obligations that one state party (as the “host 
state”) undertakes with respect to investments made by investors of the 
other state party (the “home state”). Among the most important 
obligations included in IIAs are (i) the host state’s obligation to accord 
foreign investors and investments treatment no less favorable than the 
host state accords to its own investors and investments (so-called 
national treatment) and to investors and investments of any third state 
(so-called most-favored-nation treatment); (ii) the obligation to treat 
foreign investors and investments fairly and equitably (FET) and 
accord them full protection and security (FPS); and, (iii) the prohibition 
to expropriate or nationalize foreign investments, either directly or 
indirectly (through measures having an equivalent effect), except for a 
public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner, in accordance with due 
process of law, and upon payment of a prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation.9 
Furthermore, IIAs frequently contain provisions governing the 
settlement of investor-state disputes. If a dispute between the host state 
and an investor from the home state arises and cannot be settled 
amicably, the investor may submit the dispute to arbitration under the 
auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), other designated arbitration institutions (usually 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)), London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA), or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)), or to ad hoc 
7 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2019: SPECIAL 
ECONOMIC ZONES, at xii, 99–102, U.N. Sales No. E.19.II.D.12 (2019). 
8 Glob. Affs. Can., Statement by Minister Champagne on Signing of Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, GOV’T OF CAN. (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/03/statement-by-minister-champagne 
-on-signing-of-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership.html
[https://perma.cc/DW37-C9LB]; Glob. Affs. Can., Canada Signs New Trade Agreement
with United States and Mexico, GOV’T OF CAN. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.canada
.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/11/canada-signs-new-trade-agreement-with-united-states
-and-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/GT6Z-9WVD].
9 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 6, at 147–398.
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arbitration pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules.10 In 2018, seventy-one 
publicly known investment treaty-based arbitrations were initiated 
against forty-one countries and, as of January 1, 2019, the total number 
of such claims reached 942, with 117 countries being named as a 
respondent at least once.11 
Another important element of the international investment 
protection regime is the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention), which establishes the ICSID as part of the World Bank 
Group, delineates its jurisdiction,12 and sets out the parameters of 
ICSID arbitration and conciliation proceedings.13 In particular, the 
conduct of ICSID arbitrations is governed by the ICSID Convention, 
not national law;14 ICSID arbitral awards can be challenged only in 
accordance with the annulment procedure the ICSID Convention 
provides;15 and arbitration of investment disputes under the ICSID 
Convention excludes diplomatic protection.16 Thus, unlike arbitral 
tribunals that derive their powers from national legal orders and 
adjudicate disputes in accordance with UNCITRAL or other arbitration 
10 Id., at 70–73. 
11 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 7, at xii, 102–04. 
12 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 25(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (“The jurisdiction of 
the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which 
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have 
given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”). 
13 See id. arts. 28–55. 
14 See id. art. 44 (“Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the 
Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any 
question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules 
or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.”). 
15 See id. arts. 50–52, 53(1) (“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be 
subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. 
Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that 
enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this 
Convention.”). 
16 See id. art. 27(1) (“No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an 
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting 
State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this 
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply 
with the award rendered in such dispute.”). 
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rules, the ICSID Convention creates a “delocalized” and “entirely self-
contained” system that excludes the application of any national 
procedural rules.17 Ibrahim Shihata, ICSID Secretary-General (1983–
2000), described ICSID as a “forum for conflict resolution in a 
framework which carefully balances the interests and requirements of 
all the parties involved, and attempts in particular to ‘depoliticize’ the 
settlement of investment disputes.”18 
The ISDS system thus appears to be a neutral, nonpolitical system 
for the settlement of disputes arising between foreign investors and host 
states with respect to investments made by such foreign investors. The 
next two sections of this Article will look at the international 
investment agreements as a way to increase inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and then challenge the “depoliticization” hypothesis 
by looking at investment arbitration as a possible instrument of global 
governance. 
II 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AS AN INSTRUMENT 
TO INCREASE INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) necessarily implies a contribution 
of capital over a period of time and involves the creation or acquisition 
of certain fixed assets that cannot be easily moved without significant 
loss to their value. Accordingly, under the “obsolescing bargain” 
model, the bargaining power of the host state’s government increases 
once the foreign investor has completed its investment, thus giving the 
government an incentive to secure greater benefits for itself by 
changing the original terms of the investment.19 And while direct 
expropriation was the main concern of foreign investors until the 
1970s, in modern times, host states’ governments may rely on increases 
of taxes and fees, changes in regulations, or even selective law 
enforcement to reap greater benefits from a successful investment made 
17 LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 
14 (2011); TOMÁŠ FECÁK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND EU LAW 400, 
414–15 (2016). 
18 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The 
Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.- FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 5 (1986). 
19 See Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into 
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade Agreements?, 52 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 741, 743 (2008) [hereinafter Politics of FDI].
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by a foreign person or entity.20 Therefore, to encourage incoming FDI 
flows, host states must reassure foreign investors that not only will their 
investments not be expropriated but also that the state’s regulatory 
framework will remain stable. 
In this regard, Tim Büthe and Helen Milner argue that whereas 
domestic policies usually can be modified relatively easily, especially 
if such changes come at the expense of foreigners, international 
agreements that bind host states to liberal economic policies favorable 
to foreign investors constitute “a more credible commitment regarding 
present and future economic policies.”21 On the basis of FDI statistical 
data for 122 developing and transitioning countries for the period 
from 1971 to 2007, Büthe and Milner reached the conclusion that 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), as well as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements, help developing countries increase 
incoming FDI flows precisely because such agreements have political 
(as opposed to purely economic) effects. Consequently, the agreements 
indicate a commitment to liberal economic and trade policies and make 
it harder for host states’ governments to backpedal on their promises to 
foreign investors.22 
Further statistical analysis indicates that three features of 
international treaties make host states’ commitments to foreign 
investors more credible: (i) when the treaty has actually entered into 
force; (ii) when the treaty contains investment provisions; and, 
(iii) when the treaty provides for a dispute settlement mechanism
(especially if the agreement contains specific provisions governing the
treatment of foreign investors and their investments and provides for
third-party adjudication of disputes). When a treaty includes these
features, the treaty constitutes a more credible commitment than a PTA
that has been signed, but not ratified, and does not address foreign
investment or dispute settlement.23 Importantly, the informational
effects of international economic agreements and dispute resolution
mechanisms embodied in such agreements make it possible, not only
20 Id. at 741, 743–44; Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows 
in the Developing World, 1971-2007, 66 WORLD POL. 88, 92–93 (2014) [hereinafter FDI 
and Institutional Diversity]. 
21 Politics of FDI, supra note 19, at 742. 
22 Id. at 745–47, 757; FDI and Institutional Diversity, supra note 20, at 89, 93–94. 
23 FDI and Institutional Diversity, supra note 20, at 91–92, 105, 108, 110, 112, 115. 
54 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22, 47 
for sovereign states but also for private entities, to exert costly pressure 
on host states’ governments that default on their promises and thus 
increase the role of transnational actors in governing the world 
economy.24 
ICSID Secretary-General Ibrahim Shihata emphasized that ICSID is 
not merely a platform to resolve disputes concerning foreign 
investments but an institution tasked with boosting the inflow of FDI 
into developing countries: 
ICSID should not be solely regarded as a mechanism for the 
settlement of investment disputes. Its paramount objective is to 
promote a climate of mutual confidence between investors and States 
favorable to increasing the flow of resources to developing countries 
under reasonable conditions. Like the World Bank . . . or the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency . . . ICSID must be 
regarded as an instrument of international policy for the promotion 
of investments and of economic development. The main features of 
the system ICSID’s founders devised for this instrument include its 
voluntary character, its flexibility, and its effectiveness.25 
In sum, developing countries may seek to increase inward FDI 
and achieve economic growth if they commit to liberal economic 
policies by entering into international agreements,26 especially those 
with detailed provisions promoting and protecting foreign investment 
and effective dispute settlement mechanisms.27 However, these 
institutionalized commitments have “important implications for 
democratic governance”28 because “governments pay for this increased 
inward FDI with a loss in policy autonomy.”29 As explained below, the 
implantation of arbitration (i.e., a private law instrument) into the realm 
of investor-state relations, which concerns the exercise of public 
authority, coupled with the large number of IIAs that often contain 
vague language and give arbitrators considerable interpretative powers, 
24 Politics of FDI, supra note 19, at 743, 758; FDI and Institutional Diversity, supra note 
20, at 94, 115–16. 
25 Shihata, supra note 18, at 4. 
26 The practical question of whether entering into IIAs indeed produces the desired 
economic effect (i.e., whether increasing the number of concluded IIAs leads to increased 
inward FDI and greater economic growth) is outside the scope of this Article. The reality is 
that governments continue to make commitments to foreign investors through various 
standards of investment protection embodied in IIAs, and this Article analyzes the global 
governance aspect of this phenomenon. 
27 Politics of FDI, supra note 19, at 758; FDI and Institutional Diversity, supra note 20, 
at 115. 
28 FDI and Institutional Diversity, supra note 20, at 115–16. 
29 Politics of FDI, supra note 19, at 758. 
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leads commentators to consider investment arbitration a system of 
global governance. 
III 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AS 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
This Part analyzes four different approaches to investment 
arbitration as governance. Namely, this Part analyzes the views that 
consider ISDS to be an embodiment of (a) hegemonic international 
law, (b) new constitutionalism, (c) global administrative law, and 
(d) “humanity’s law.”
A. Hegemonic International Law
Some critics characterize the international investment protection 
regime as a species of hegemonic international law (HIL)30 that 
discards the sovereign equality of states.31 According to this approach, 
norms of international law should recognize power inequalities in the 
real world where weaker states pledge loyalty to the hegemon in 
exchange for security or economic assistance.32 Binding international 
legal regimes and potent international organizations may impose 
constraints on the hegemon and thus endanger its status. In practice, 
therefore, the hegemons support the position that treaties lack a legally 
binding effect and that a hegemon’s abstention is enough to prevent an 
emerging rule from being general and consequently becoming a part of 
customary international law.33 Overall, HIL embraces a shift from a 
rule-based system toward a vague international legal order based on the 
hegemon state’s demonstrations of military force and its routine 
intervention in internal affairs of weaker states.34  
30 Jose E. Alvarez, Is the International Investment Regime a Form of Global 
Governance?, in ARBITRATION: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS 137, 150 (Albert Jan van den Berg 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter Global Governance]. 
31 In the context of HIL, the terms “hegemon” and “hegemonic” refer to a particular state 
or a category of states (i.e., developed states of the Global North as opposed to the 
developing states of the Global South), not to a particular ideology. In contrast, new 
constitutionalism, addressed infra Part II Section C, focuses on neoliberalism as a 
hegemonic ideology reflected in investment protection standards embodied in IIAs. 
32 Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 845 (2001); 
Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 873 (2003) 
[hereinafter Hegemonic International Law Revisited]. 
33 Vagts, supra note 32, at 846–47. 
34 Hegemonic International Law Revisited, supra note 32, at 873. 
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However, to conclude that hegemonic powers function in the 
absence of the law would oversimplify reality. In some areas, including 
international trade and investment, the hegemon may benefit from 
having a body of suitably adapted norms of international law.35 After 
all, “[t]he hegemon is also a trading party and the world of trade needs 
rules.”36  
For instance, although the United States is generally skeptical 
toward international institutions and lags behind other states in 
ratifying international treaties (such as the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), this 
skepticism does not apply to trade and investment norms.37 In 
particular, the United States actively participated in the multilateral 
trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the GATT, as 
well as in establishing the WTO, completing the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and negotiating the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) between members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).38 
Because formal equality with respect to trade and investment matters 
usually produces more favorable results for a superior economic power, 
the hegemon’s general skepticism toward binding international law and 
its particular skepticism toward binding adjudication of international 
disputes is much less evident in the areas of international trade and 
investment.39 Krisch points out that “[i]n matters of trade, the equality 
of the rules is hardly a threat to the powerful.”40  
Furthermore, dominant states prefer to use international law in ways 
that put fewer constraints on their behavior and provide more space 
for non-egalitarian elements and unequal power relations.41 For 
instance, the United States is active in negotiating, entering into, and 
enforcing bilateral treaties on trade, investment, tax, and mutual legal 
assistance because bilateral negotiations are prone to being influenced 
by the superior bargaining power of one party. In contrast, multilateral 
35 Vagts, supra note 32, at 845. 
36 Id. 
37 Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 384 (2005) (It.). 
38 Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 
11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 713, 717–19, 722, 757 (2002). 
39 Krisch, supra note 37, at 384–85. 
40 Id. at 385. 
41 Id. at 389. 
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negotiations allow weaker states to pull together their resources and 
counterbalance the dominant state’s power.42 Former President of the 
United States Donald Trump has endorsed this approach: on his first 
day in office, he issued a memorandum directing the United States 
Trade Representative to withdraw from the CPTPP, a trade agreement 
between twelve states, and instead “to begin pursuing, wherever 
possible, bilateral trade negotiations to promote American industry, 
protect American workers, and raise American wages.”43 
Guzman points out that developing countries that actively opposed 
the rule requiring “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation for 
expropriated investments in favor of a more relaxed standard ended up 
entering into BITs that provide for a stronger protection of foreign 
investments than required by the minimum standard of treatment under 
the customary international law.44 He argues that developing countries 
face a prisoner’s dilemma. Developing countries as a group would 
benefit more from entering into agreements that leave more flexibility 
for host states vis-à-vis foreign investors and do not allow foreign 
investors to enforce such agreements in international forums. But, in 
the race to attract foreign investments, individual developing countries 
enter into BITs that give foreign investors enforceable rights and 
provide investors with access to international investor-state arbitration 
mechanisms.45 In sum, BITs give individual developing countries an 
ability to make enforceable promises to potential investors, making 
these countries more attractive to foreign investors and allowing them 
to attract a higher volume of foreign investments. But, BITs may not 
be an appropriate tool to increase the overall welfare of developing 
countries as a group and can even cause them to suffer an overall 
welfare loss.46 
In summary, HIL scholars view the investment protection as a legal 
regime imposed by certain hegemonic powers with the aim to limit, 
through investment treaties and their subsequent interpretations by 
42 Id. at 389–90. 
43 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
44 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 643 (1997). 
45 Id. at 643, 666–69. 
46 Id. at 674, 688. 
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arbitral tribunals, the range of policy options available to developing 
countries.47 
B. Global Administrative Law
Other commentators, who speak in “less loaded terms”48 than 
“hegemonic international law,” describe investment regime as a 
species of “global administrative law” (GAL).49 Kingsbury, Krisch, 
and Stewart defined GAL as “the mechanisms, principles, practices, 
and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect 
the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by 
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, 
reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review 
of the rules and decisions they make.”50 They argue that GAL 
encompasses the spectrum of actions, including rulemaking, 
adjudication, and other decision-making, that lies between making 
international treaties and simply settling disputes between states.51 
Moreover, they argue that investment arbitration is a powerful tool for 
investors to challenge administrative actions of host states, thus 
imposing both procedural and substantive limitations on domestic 
regulators.52 
Similarly, Kingsbury and Schill argue that investment arbitration 
serves as a review mechanism where the arbitral tribunal examines 
whether the government has duly balanced investor protection and 
other important public goals.53 Furthermore, when interpreting broadly 
worded standards of investment protection set out in various BITs, 
tribunals define the standards of good governance and rule of law that 
are enforceable by foreign investors against host states. Thus, the 
awards rendered in investment arbitration affect more than the parties 
in a particular dispute.54  
47 Global Governance, supra note 30, at 150–51. 
48 Id. at 151. 
49 Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68:15 L.  
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15–61 (2005); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 121–
50 (2006) (It.); BENEDICT KINGSBURY & STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION AS GOVERNANCE: FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, PROPORTIONALITY 
AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2009). 
50 Kingsbury et al., supra note 49, at 17. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 36–37; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 49, at 122. 
53 KINGSBURY & SCHILL, supra note 49, at 1. 
54 Id. 
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For instance, although the Tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States 
noted that its mandate was “similar to the case-specific mandate 
ordinarily found in international commercial arbitration”55 (i.e., to 
resolve a particular dispute arising out of or in connection with a 
particular commercial contract), the Tribunal acknowledged that it had 
to take into account implications of the decisions on the “significant 
public system of private investment protection” contained in Chapter 
11.56 The Tribunal then stated that in deciding an investor-state dispute, 
it had to take into account systematic implications of the Tribunal’s 
award:  
The fact that any particular tribunal need not live with the challenge 
of applying its reasoning in the case before it to a host of different 
future disputes (the challenge faced by standing adjudicative bodies) 
does not mean such a tribunal can ignore that challenge. A case-
specific mandate is not license to ignore systemic implications. To 
the contrary, it arguably makes it all the more important that each 
tribunal renders its case-specific decision with sensitivity to the 
position of future tribunals and an awareness of other systemic 
implications.57 
Kingsbury and Schill argue that investment arbitration jurisprudence 
on the host state’s obligation to accord “fair and equitable treatment” 
to foreign investors constitutes part of jurisprudence on modern public 
administration. Hence, the role of investment arbitration is to develop 
a body of standards for the exercise of public powers in administrative, 
judicial, and legislative proceedings.58 
In turn, Van Harten and Loughlin write that if GAL is understood as 
a system similar to a judicial review mechanism, which is tasked with 
keeping the exercise of public authority within the bounds of legality 
and providing enforceable remedies to those negatively affected by 
government’s unlawful actions, then treaty-based investment 
arbitration appears to be “the only case of global administrative law 
in the world today.”59 Van Harten and Loughlin outline four 
characteristics of investment arbitration that highlight its resemblance 
to GAL: (i) the absence of a duty to exhaust local remedies as a 
precondition to bringing a claim before an international arbitral tribunal 
(the principle of individualization); (ii) availability of damages as a 
55 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 3 (June 8, 2009). 
56 Id. ¶ 5. 
57 Id. ¶ 6. 
58 See KINGSBURY & SCHILL, supra note 49, at 8–9. 
59 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 49, at 149. 
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public law remedy (the damages principle); (iii) enforceability of 
arbitral awards with limited supervision by national courts (principle 
of direct enforceability); and (iv) the possibility to make use of a 
favorable BIT by incorporating a holding company in a desirable 
jurisdiction (the forum-shopping principle).60 
C. New Constitutionalism
Some scholars observe that IIAs play a constitutional function as 
they provide a framework for the global rule of law and expansion of 
transnational investment activities.61 New constitutionalism scholars 
criticize the system of investor-state dispute resolution as an instrument 
of “disciplinary neoliberalism.”62 Neoliberalism may be defined as “a 
theory of political economy that hypothesizes that human well-being 
will be advanced by the practices associated with free markets,”63 and 
relegates the state to “creat[ing] and preserv[ing] an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices,”64 including defining 
and protecting property rights, guaranteeing the enforceability of 
contractual obligations, and providing security and policing so as to 
ensure stable functioning of free markets.65 David Schneiderman 
considers globalization to be a “cultural project with the normative 
object of actively suppressing alternatives”66 and notes that, in the 
context of economic globalization, “[l]egal disciplines erect barriers 
that cabin political possibilities and suppress alternative futures.”67 
Globalization, therefore, “represents the institutionalization of 
neoliberalism on a global scale.”68 
Schneiderman analyzes the interplay between transnational legality 
and “local agency” (nation-states) in what he calls “an age when 
60 Id. at 122, 127–39. 
61 A. Claire Cutler, Human Rights Promotion Through Transnational Investment 
Regimes: An International Political Economy Approach, 1 POL. & GOVERNANCE 16, 18 
(2013) (Port.) [hereinafter Human Rights Promotion]; STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE 
MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 17 (2009). 
62 Global Governance, supra note 30, at 152. 
63 David Schneiderman, Transnational Legality and the Immobilization of Local 
Agency, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 387, 390 (2006) [hereinafter Immobilization of Local 
Agency]. 
64 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEO-LIBERALISM 2 (2005). 
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powerful economic actors seek to supplant national state authority.”69 
Schneiderman suggests that while transnational economic law distrusts 
local rulemaking, it necessarily relies on various state institutions and 
legal forms as support structures that preserve the legitimacy of 
transnational legality over time.70 In other words, democratic national 
states are paramount to the success of the neoliberal project,71 and 
“[s]tate actors, indeed, have been energetically working to maintain 
neoliberalism’s supremacy.”72 In the age of economic globalization, 
sovereign states do not exercise their governance powers to the least 
possible extent, as proponents of the Chicago school of economics 
suggest.73 Instead, Schneiderman argues neoliberalism no longer 
operates solely with the aim of “mobilization and extension of 
markets (and market logics).” Rather, neoliberalism also focuses on 
reconstruction of state functions along the line preferred by powerful 
market players, as well as on disciplining those who were marginalized 
by the neoliberalization of the economy.74 The role of states in the 
neoliberal project is thus twofold. State involvement is necessary to, 
first, “erec[t] the scaffolding upon which the rules and structures of 
economic globalization operate” and, second, to “restructure domestic 
legal relations to augment the norms of transnational legality.”75 
Stephen Gill identified three “dimensions,” or “sets of ‘productive 
constraints,’” of new constitutionalism, including measures to 
(i) reconfigure the state apparatuses, (ii) construct and extend capitalist
markets, and (iii) deal with dislocations and contradictions.76 The new
constitutionalism project thus isolates large sectors of the economy
from the influence of politicians or citizen groups by placing binding
69 Id. at 388. 
70 Id.; David Schneiderman, How to Govern Differently: Neoliberalism, New 
Constitutionalism and International Investment Law, in NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
WORLD ORDER 165, 165–66 (A. Claire Cutler & Stephen Gill eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
Govern Differently]. 
71 Immobilization of Local Agency, supra note 63, at 394. For a more in-depth 
discussion, see STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2003) and ULRICH BECK, POWER IN THE GLOBAL AGE: A NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (2005). 
72 Govern Differently, supra note 70, at 165. 
73 Id. at 166. 
74 Id. at 171. 
75 Immobilization of Local Agency, supra note 63, at 394. 
76 Stephen Gill, Market Civilization, New Constitutionalism and World Order, in NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER 29, 38–42 (Stephen Gill & A. Claire Cutler eds., 
2014) [hereinafter Market Civilization]. 
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constraints, both internal and external, on the making and execution of 
financial, trade, and investment policies.77 
In turn, the international investment protection regime is, in 
Schneiderman’s opinion, an “institutional partner” of neoliberalism 
and a “superconstitution” that seeks to impose a set of binding 
constraints on sovereign states to isolate economic policy-making from 
democratic process.78 Substantive standards of investment protection, 
contained in various IIAs, prohibit a range of state actions interfering 
with foreign investment, and international investment arbitration 
mechanisms effectively remove foreign investment disputes from 
host states’ courts. Consequently, IIAs “elevate” foreign investment 
disputes to a “depoliticized” dispute resolution forum.79 In sum, the 
emergence of the global investment protection framework may be 
equated to the “arrival of new transnational legal rules and institutions 
intended to entrench constitution-like limits on the exercise of local 
political authority far into the future.”80 
D. Humanity’s Law
Teitel and Howse proposed a more optimistic framework for 
analyzing the development of international dispute settlement in the 
context of discussing “tribunalization.”81 Tribunalization is a recent 
trend toward the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, 
coupled with the increasing use of such adjudicative bodies to interpret 
the rules of international law and to settle disputes between states and 
other actors.82 Teitel and Howse argue that both the optimistic 
hypothesis, which praises tribunalization as depoliticization and a shift 
from a power-based to a rule-based system of international relations, 
and the pessimistic hypothesis, which characterizes tribunalization as a 
threat to integrity and legitimacy of the international legal order, are 
too simplistic and misleading.83 Instead, Teitel and Howse point out 
77 Immobilization of Local Agency, supra note 63, at 391. For more information, see 
Stephen Gill, Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism, 24 
MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 399, 412 (1995) (U.K.) [hereinafter Globalisation] and GILL, 
supra note 71. 
78 DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: 
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 2–3 (2008). 
79 Govern Differently, supra note 70, at 172. 
80 Immobilization of Local Agency, supra note 63, at 387–88. 
81 Global Governance, supra note 30, at 153. 
82 Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but 
Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 959, 959–60 (2009). 
83 Id. at 961–62. 
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that some tribunals “become the most evident sites of the new global 
politics of contestation between diverse actors,”84 including not only 
sovereign states but also private individuals, business corporations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local communities. This 
emerging legal order, informed by human rights law, centers on 
persons and peoples, rather than states and state interests.85 Teitel 
defines this new, normative regime as “humanity’s law.”86 
With respect to international investment law and tribunalization, 
Teitel and Howse argue that the forms and functions of investment 
protection differed during four historic periods.87 First, traditionally, 
foreign investors had to rely on their home states to exercise diplomatic 
protection, premised on the sovereign equality of states and that a harm 
caused to a foreign state’s national was an injury caused to the foreign 
state itself.88 Second, during decolonization and the Cold War, arbitral 
tribunals played depoliticizing and de-escalating functions in 
investment disputes between corporations from the North and West and 
governments from the East and South.89 Third, with the emergence of 
the Washington Consensus and the end of the Cold War, IIAs and 
ISDS mechanisms allowed developing countries to make a credible 
commitment to foreign investors, providing them with enforceable 
rights, reducing the political risk, and allowing them to attract larger 
volumes of foreign investment.90 The arbitrators acknowledged this 
role of investment protection regime in Tecmed v. Mexico, where the 
Tribunal stated that, by entering into the applicable BIT, Spain and 
Mexico “intended to strengthen and increase the security and trust of 
foreign investors that invest in the member States, thus maximizing the 
use of the economic resources of each Contracting Party.”91 Similarly, 
Thomas Wälde in Thunderbird v. Mexico noted that “international 
84 Id. at 961. 
85 Id. at 968–69. 
86 Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 355, 357 (2002); Teitel & Howse, supra note 82, at 969. 
87 Teitel & Howse, supra note 82, at 977–81. 
88 Id. at 977; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 6, at 1–10. 
89 Teitel & Howse, supra note 82, at 977–78. 
90 Id. at 978. 
91 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 156 (May 29, 2003). 
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investment law is aimed at promoting foreign investment by providing 
effective protection to foreign investors.”92 
Finally, Teitel and Howse argue a fourth historic period began with 
cases where foreign investors filed claims against governments that 
backpedaled on their commitments to privatization and economic 
liberalization due to high human costs and political or economic 
crises.93 Such claims by foreign investors sparked sharp criticism from 
NGOs and civil society groups, and this criticism of investment 
arbitration forced the tribunals to function more transparently and 
devote more attention to human rights and legitimate public policy 
interests in assessing the host state’s conduct. For instance, in 
Methanex v. United States, the Tribunal declared that, because there 
was “undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration” and the 
“substantive issues extend[ed] far beyond those raised by the usual 
transnational arbitration between commercial parties,”94 the arbitrators 
had the power to consider amici curiae submissions from the 
NGOs.95 Most recently, in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the arbitrators 
acknowledged that “investment tribunals should pay great deference to 
governmental judgments of national needs in matters such as the 
protection of public health.”96 
Overall, Teitel and Howse suggest that if investment arbitration 
tribunals consider human rights law in their decisions, the outcome of 
the tribunalization process would be a “new international investment 
law that embodies what is perceived as a just, humanity-oriented 
balance of rights and obligations.”97 
IV 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE EXERCISE 
OF CRIMINAL POWERS BY SOVEREIGN STATES 
However broadly the boundaries of arbitral tribunals’ adjudicative 
powers and jurisdiction are pushed, international arbitration remains a 
dispute resolution mechanism for controversies arising out of 
92 Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of 
Thomas Wälde, ¶ 4 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
93 Teitel & Howse, supra note 82, at 979. 
94 Methanex Co. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions 
from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 49 (Jan. 15, 2001). 
95 Id. ¶ 53. 
96 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 399 (July 8, 2016). 
97 Teitel & Howse, supra note 82, at 981. 
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international trade and investment, even if the adjudication of such 
disputes requires arbitral tribunals to consider the state’s regulatory or 
criminal laws. Hence, two concerns arise with respect to parallel 
international arbitration and criminal proceedings: first, the fear that 
states may initiate criminal investigations in bad faith, to expropriate 
the investment, or to harass or intimidate the investor; and, second, 
even legitimately initiated criminal proceedings may adversely affect 
the integrity of ongoing arbitration proceedings, hamper access to 
evidence, or tamper with witnesses.98 
Before analyzing how different conceptualizations of investment 
arbitration as a system of global governance capture the tensions 
arising between the resolution of economic disputes in ISDS and the 
enforcement of criminal law by host states, this Part gives a brief 
overview of cases where the dispute concerned alleged mistreatment or 
harassment of an investor in the context of criminal proceedings. First, 
this section looks at early arbitral jurisprudence, from Benvenuti 
v. People’s Republic of the Congo99 to Hamester v. Ghana.100 Next,
it considers the Rompetrol v. Romania101 decision and subsequent
jurisprudence.
A. Early Arbitral Jurisprudence: From Benvenuti to Hamester
The first modern investor-state arbitration cases concerning alleged
irregularities and improprieties in criminal investigations, searches, 
seizures, and arrests arose as early as the 1970s. For instance, in 
Benvenuti v. Congo, the Tribunal held that the host state violated a joint 
venture agreement with an investor, in particular, through their military 
occupation of the investor’s property and by initiating criminal 
proceedings against the Italian manager of the company, prompting 
him to leave the Congo.102 The Tribunal noted that the host state had 
98 Ruslan Mirzayev, International Investment Protection Regime and Criminal 
Investigations, 29 J. INT’L ARB. 71, 71 (2012) (U.K.). 
99 S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/77/2, Award, ¶¶ 4.41–.46, 4.56–.65 (Aug. 8, 1980) 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 144, 148–49 
(1983). 
100 Gustav F. W. Hamester GmbH v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, 
Award, ¶¶ 292–300 (June 18, 2010). 
101 Rompetrol Grp. N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶¶ 3, 38–39 
(May 6, 2013). 
102 S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant, 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. at 148–49. See Karel Daele, 
Investment Arbitration Involving African States, in ARBITRATION IN AFRICA: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, 403, 426 (Lise Bosman ed., 2013). 
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not provided “any document that would enable [the Tribunal] to 
determine the merits of this criminal proceeding.”103 
In Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, the dispute arose 
when the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.) military forces 
raided Mr. Mitchell’s legal consulting firm under the suspicion that his 
firm was holding money for a company with ties to an anti-government 
rebel group.104 The D.R.C. sealed the firm’s premises, seized 
documents, and imprisoned two lawyers for more than eight months.105 
The Tribunal concluded that the D.R.C. expropriated the claimant’s 
investment in violation of the Congo-USA BIT.106 This award was 
subsequently annulled on the grounds of manifest excess of powers and 
failure to state reasons.107 
Similarly, in Ahmonseto v. Egypt, the Tribunal considered whether 
Egypt violated the Egypt-USA BIT by initiating “groundless, unfair 
and unreasonable” criminal investigations against the claimants and 
imprisoning one of them.108 First, the arbitrators noted that although 
criminal prosecutions are “to a large extent” outside the scope of the 
applicable BIT, the Tribunal had the authority to assess whether the 
host state acted arbitrarily.109 The Tribunal then set out the framework 
for such an assessment: a breach of the BIT occurs only when a 
criminal investigation is “fundamentally unjustified and groundless” 
and prevents the investors from managing their business.110 A breach 
also occurs when a detention of an investor amounts to a “measure 
that gravely violates the rights of the person placed in custody” 
and excessively impairs the investment.111 The Tribunal then 
acknowledged that it was not an international court of human rights or 
a public authority entrusted to apply criminal law, but rather a panel 
charged with adjudicating disputes over investments.112 Ultimately, the 
majority of the Tribunal concluded that the conduct of the criminal 
103 S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant, 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. at 148. 
104 Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Award, 
¶¶ 1, 62–66, 71–72, 74 (Feb. 9, 2004). See Daele, supra note 102, at 428. 
105 See Mitchell, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, ¶¶ 62, 72. 
106 Id. ¶ 102(2). 
107 Id. Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 67 (Nov. 1, 2006). 
108 Ahmonseto, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/15, Award, 
¶¶ 250, 262 (June 18, 2007), 23:2 ICSID Rev. 352, 354 (2008). See Daele, supra note 102, 
at 423–34. 
109 Ahmonseto, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/15, Award, ¶ 254. 
110 Id. ¶ 255. 
111 Id. ¶ 262. 
112 Id. 
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investigations and the detention of one of the claimants did not lead to 
direct impairment of the investment and thereby did not amount to 
inequitable treatment under the BIT.113 
Later, in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, the claimant alleged that 
Ukrainian state agencies had targeted the claimant’s wholly owned 
Ukrainian subsidiary, Taky Spravy, with a lasting campaign of 
oppression prompted by persons in high authority. The claimant 
asserted that the state tax administration and the prosecutor’s office 
unjustifiably interfered on numerous instances with Taky Spravy’s 
business activities and management and that the agencies disguised this 
interference as lawful investigations into violations of Ukrainian 
economic laws.114  
The claimant further argued that the state agencies’ actions 
constituted an intentional and premeditated campaign of destruction of 
Taky Spravy’s business as retaliation for supporting an opposing 
politician. Additionally, the claimant contended that the state agencies’ 
overall interference with Taky Spravy’s business constituted an 
unlawful expropriation of the claimant’s investment and breached 
Ukraine’s fair and equitable treatment obligation under the Ukraine-
Lithuania BIT.115 In particular, Mr. Oleksandr Danylov, Taky Spravy’s 
general director, had been subject to criminal investigation for tax 
evasion since May 2002 and had been officially indicted in July 
2002.116 
The claimant filed a request for arbitration with the ICSID in August 
2002 and resubmitted the request in November 2002.117 Meanwhile, 
Mr. Danylov left Ukraine for Lithuania, where he was granted refugee 
status in May 2003, and he did not return to Ukraine until March 2005, 
after mass protests and a runoff presidential election pushed the 
existing regime out of power.118 Although in April 2005 the state tax 
administration notified Mr. Danylov that the case against him had been 
closed for lack of evidence, the case was subsequently reopened and 
closed again several times.119 At the hearing on the merits, Mr. Danylov 
113 Id. ¶¶ 264–67. 
114 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶¶ 2, 4, 12 (July 26, 
2007). 
115 Id. ¶¶ 4, 12–13. 
116 Id. ¶¶ 2, 58. 
117 Id. ¶¶ 16, 18–19. 
118 Id. ¶¶ 9, 58–59. 
119 Id. ¶¶ 59–60. 
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testified that during his meetings with high-level officials at the 
Prosecutor General’s Office and the Head of the State Police, the 
officials linked the criminal case to the ICSID claim.120 
The Tribunal acknowledged that “a manifest and gross failure to 
comply with the elementary principles of justice in the conduct of 
criminal proceedings, when directed towards an investor in the 
operation of his investment,” may constitute a breach of an investment 
treaty.121 However, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the claimant 
was a target of a politically motivated campaign of harassment.122 
Some facts appeared to weigh in favor of Taky Spravy’s claim: the 
state’s actions against Taky Spravy began just days after the company 
published campaign materials for the opposition party; the tax 
authorities issued public statements that Taky Spravy was suspected of 
crimes that those authorities had already decided not to pursue further; 
and the character and duration of the investigation were consistent with 
the claimant’s theory.123 The Tribunal also noted that “it is difficult 
to reconcile the criminal proceeding against O. Danylov, which the 
State has opened and closed a total of five times, with general principles 
of due process.”124 But, the Tribunal also noted the investigation into 
Taky Spravy was the result of a separate investigation into Taky 
Spravy’s contractors that had begun before Taky Spravy produced 
materials for the opposition party, due to signs of being sham 
enterprises.125 Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant 
failed to furnish sufficient evidence that measures implemented by the 
state agencies were part of a politically motivated conspiracy designed 
to put the claimant’s Ukrainian subsidiary out of business.126 
Lastly, in Hamester v. Ghana, the claimant alleged the host state 
started a police investigation against the managing director of the joint 
venture company as a part of a scheme to expropriate the claimant’s 
investment.127 However, the Tribunal determined from documentary 
evidence that the criminal proceedings did not appear, prima facie, 
to lack a foundation.128 Furthermore, the legality of the criminal 
120 Id. ¶ 60. 
121 Id. ¶ 133. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. ¶ 114. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. ¶ 115. 
126 Id. ¶¶ 134–37. 
127 Gustav F. W. Hamester GmbH v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, 
Award, ¶ 292 (June 18, 2010). See Daele, supra note 102, at 431. 
128 Gustav F. W. Hamester GmbH, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 298. 
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proceedings was irrelevant because the managing director himself 
admitted that “the matter was not pursued by the police.”129 Therefore, 
the investigation was not in violation of the host state’s obligations 
under the Germany-Ghana BIT.130 The arbitrators also noted that “[a] 
State may obviously exercise its sovereign powers to investigate and 
prosecute criminal actions.”131 
B. The Turning Point: Rompetrol v. Romania and
Subsequent Cases 
In the cases summarized above, arbitral tribunals had to address the 
claimants’ submissions that their investments were harmed by the 
conduct of the host states’ law enforcement agencies. In turn, 
Rompetrol v. Romania appears to be the first case where allegations of 
the host state’s misconduct in the context of a criminal investigation 
were at the center of the investment dispute.132 This case required the 
Tribunal to elaborate on the interrelationship between protection of 
foreign investment and enforcement of domestic criminal law.133 
The dispute in Rompetrol v. Romania arose from the purchase of 
shares by the claimant (TRG) in RRC, a privatized Romanian oil and 
petrochemical company.134 The claimant alleged that government-
ordered investigations of RRC and its management, as well as arbitrary 
treatment of the company, violated the Netherlands-Romania BIT.135 
The host state answered that the investigations were merely part of the 
implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy.136 
The Tribunal noted that the specific nature of the dispute 
“originate[d] in and focus[ed] on measures taken by authorities of the 
Respondent state in the area of investigation and possible prosecution 
of criminal offences.”137 These measures, however, were not directly 
aimed at the investor (TRG) or its investments in the host state. Instead, 
these measures were directed against two former TRG officers, Mr. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. ¶¶ 297, 300. 
131 Id. ¶ 297. 
132 Rompetrol Grp. N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶¶ 3, 38–39, 
46, 50, 82 (May 6, 2013). 
133 See id. ¶¶ 3, 38–39. 
134 Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 
135 Id. ¶¶ 3, 38–39. 
136 Id. ¶ 39. 
137 Id. ¶ 151. 
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Dan Patriciu and Mr. George Stephenson, and concerned their role in 
the affairs of the claimant’s Romanian subsidiary and management of 
the Dutch holding company.138 The tribunal thus set out three 
categories of state actions that would fall within the scope of protection 
under the BIT, namely the actions that target the investment or the 
investor itself, the investor’s executives for their activities on behalf of 
the investor, or the investor’s executives personally, but with the aim 
to harm the investor.139 At times, the Tribunal appeared hesitant to 
make pronouncements on the conduct of criminal investigations by the 
authorities of the host state.140 The outcome of the case, however, 
necessarily depended on the claimant’s ability to prove that the 
investigations against the persons associated with the investor had 
breached the claimant’s rights itself, i.e., that these criminal 
investigations were incompatible with the treatment the claimant was 
entitled to expect under the terms of the applicable BIT.141 
On the one hand, the arbitrators declared that they 
would be acutely sensitive to any well-founded allegation that 
the investment arbitration process was intended to (or was in fact 
operating in such a way as to) block or inhibit the legitimate operation 
of the State’s inherent function in the investigation, repression and 
punishment of crime, including economic crime and corruption.142 
The Tribunal also confirmed several times that its role was not to 
second-guess the decisions of the Romanian law enforcement 
agencies.143 First, the Tribunal noted that the parties shared an 
understanding that:  
[T]he Tribunal is not called upon to act as Romanian judge of final
instance, either to pronounce on the rightness or wrongness of the
pending criminal charges or to substitute a view of its own for the
decisions of the competent Romanian instances on individual steps
in the prosecutions or preliminary investigations, or on any other
internal process.144
Second, the Tribunal disclaimed any supervisory function over 
the criminal investigation conducted by national law enforcement 
agencies: 
138 Id. 
139 Id. ¶ 200. 
140 Id. ¶ 151. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. ¶ 152. 
143 Id. ¶¶ 174, 233, 237–38. 
144 Id. ¶ 174. 
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There was at a certain stage in the proceedings some debate between 
the Parties as to whether the criminal investigations were so devoid 
of substantial merit (i.e. of real and grounded suspicion of the 
possible commission of criminal offences) that they had to be 
presumed to have been initiated and then pursued out of improper 
motives. But the Parties were in the event agreed that it was not for 
this Tribunal to determine whether adequate grounds (‘probable 
cause’) did or did not exist under Romanian law to justify the opening 
of an investigation, and by so doing either to supervise or to supplant 
the decisions of the competent organs of the Romanian judicial 
system. The Tribunal can only agree.145 
The Tribunal discussed the indictment and its charges as follows: 
The indictment would thus appear . . . to offer the necessary basis on 
which each of the accused can then set about preparing his defence. 
To note that is of course wholly without prejudice to whether the 
factual allegations are indeed accurate and sustainable, and the legal 
argument correct. As already noted however, those assessments are 
not for this Tribunal to make, but are a matter for the Romanian 
courts. The Parties are in agreement . . . that it is not for this Tribunal 
to determine whether or not there was a substantial basis for the 
criminal charges against Mr. Patriciu and his associates.146 
Third, the Tribunal emphasized that it was not a court of final appeal 
deciding on the operation of the host state’s criminal justice system: 
The Claimant advances a whole series of actions by the State 
prosecutors in charge of the PNA and DIICOT investigations which 
it says were unjustified or wrongful, and which it asks the Tribunal 
to find were part of a pattern of deliberately oppressive conduct 
against Mr. Patriciu and the others under investigation. It would be 
impossible for the Tribunal to investigate all of these accusations in 
detail—and indeed to do so would contradict the underlying 
proposition . . . that it is not for an investment tribunal to set itself up 
as a court of final review over the criminal justice systems of host 
States.147 
On the other hand, the Tribunal agreed with the claimant that “the 
pursuit of crime—or even its mere invocation—cannot serve on its own 
as a justification for conduct that breaches the rights of foreign 
investors under applicable treaties.”148 The Tribunal examined the 
formal indictment against Mr. Patriciu and Mr. Stephenson and was 
satisfied that the indictment laid the charges, facts, and evidence 
145 Id. ¶ 233. 
146 Id. ¶ 237. 
147 Id. ¶ 238. 
148 Id. ¶ 152. 
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against them in sufficient detail, so that the indictment did not, “on its 
face, bear out any argument that it embodies a trumped-up set of 
criminal allegations that are accordingly only explicable as stemming 
from bias or improper motive.”149 Then, to address the claimant’s 
allegations that persistent irregularities in the course of the criminal 
investigation constituted a pattern of intentionally oppressive conduct, 
the Tribunal addressed the following: the attachment of RRC shares, 
the arrest and attempted imprisonment of Patriciu and Stephenson, the 
press releases issued by the Romanian law enforcement authorities, 
Patriciu’s and RRC’s intercepted telephone conversations, and the 
requests for information from banks and the tax controls.150 While 
some law enforcement activities did not raise concerns, the Tribunal 
noted that the continued prosecutorial delay evidenced “prosecutorial 
animus” toward the claimant.151 The attempts to imprison Mr. Patriciu 
“reflect[ed] no credit on the . . . prosecutors”152 and, together with the 
attempts to wiretap his phones,153 “suggest[ed] that there were elements 
in the State apparatus determined to pin something on Mr. Patriciu, if 
they could.”154 
In the end, even though the Tribunal dismissed the claimant’s 
contention of a politically motivated campaign of harassment, the 
Tribunal concluded that procedural irregularities during the criminal 
investigation, in the absence of any evidence that the respondent 
attempted to avoid or minimize the possibility of harming the foreign 
investor, amounted to a breach of the host state’s fair and equitable 
treatment obligation.155 However, because the claimant failed to prove 
that it suffered economic loss or damage from the host state’s breach 
of the BIT, no compensation was awarded.156 
For the purposes of this Article, which focuses on investment 
protection and the exercise of the state power to investigate and 
prosecute crimes, two findings made by the Rompetrol v. Romania 
tribunal merit special attention. First, the Tribunal found that foreign 
investors have legitimate expectations as to the conduct of criminal 
investigations where foreign investors’ interests are implicated: 
149 Id. ¶ 237. 
150 Id. ¶ 238. 
151 Id. ¶ 248. 
152 Id. ¶ 251. 
153 Id. ¶¶ 255–61. 
154 Id. ¶ 261. 
155 Id. ¶¶ 277–79. 
156 Id. ¶ 299. 
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[I]n this Tribunal’s view, a State may incur international
responsibility for breaching its obligation under an investment treaty
to accord fair and equitable treatment to a protected investor by a
pattern of wrongful conduct during the course of a criminal
investigation or prosecution, even where the investigation and
prosecution are not themselves wrongful. The provisos are however
that the pattern must be sufficiently serious and persistent, that the
interests of the investor must be affected, and that there is a failure in
these circumstances to pay adequate regard to how those interests
ought to be duly protected. In the Tribunal’s considered view, it is
part of the legitimate expectations of a protected investor—without
in any way trenching upon the sovereign right of the host State to
prescribe and enforce its criminal law—that, if its interests find
themselves caught up in the criminal process either directly or
indirectly, means will be sought by the authorities of the host State to
avoid any unnecessarily adverse effect on those interests or at least
to minimise or mitigate the adverse effects.157
Second, the arbitrators warned that an inquiry into the conduct of a 
criminal investigation is necessarily fact-sensitive, and that host states 
will be found liable only in isolated cases: 
[T]he Tribunal wishes to make it plain that it would not regard any
breach, or indeed any series of breaches, of procedural safeguards
provided by national or international law in the context of a criminal
investigation or prosecution as giving rise to the breach of an
obligation of fair and equitable treatment. All will depend on the
nature and strength of the evidence in the particular case, on the
impact of the events complained about on the protected investor or
investment, and on the severity and persistence of any breaches that
can be duly proved, as well as on whatever justification the
respondent State may offer for the course of events. The Tribunal’s
finding is based entirely on the facts of the present case.158
In turn, in the Yukos Cases, the dispute concerned various measures, 
including criminal prosecutions and tax reassessments, taken by the 
Russian Federation against OAO Yukos Oil Company (Yukos) and 
related persons and entities between July 2003 and November 
2007.159 In February 2005, three controlling shareholders in Yukos 
(Hulley, YUL, and Veteran Petroleum) initiated parallel arbitration 
157 Id. ¶ 278. 
158 Id. ¶ 279. 
159 Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russia, No. AA 227, PCA Case Repository, 
Final Award, ¶ 63 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014) (The parallel arbitrations—Hulley Enters. Ltd. 
(Cyprus) v. Russia, No. AA 226, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, ¶ 63 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2014) and Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russia, No. AA 228, PCA Case Repository, 
Final Award, ¶ 63 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014)—will not be cited going forward because the cited 
portions of the three arbitrations are identical to each other.). 
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proceedings, arguing that the Russian Federation breached the Energy 
Charter Treaty160 by expropriating the claimants’ investments and 
failing to treat them in a fair and equitable manner.161 
The claimants alleged that a series of criminal investigations 
and prosecutions, as well as accompanying searches and seizures, 
constituted a campaign of harassment against the executives, 
employees, auditors, and lawyers of Yukos. These harassment 
allegations were thought to be aimed at expropriating Yukos’s assets 
and removing Mr. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the then principal 
shareholder and CEO of Yukos, as a political threat.162 Mr. 
Khodorkovsky and Mr. Platon Lebedev, the then directors of Hulley 
and YUL, were arrested in 2003 on charges of fraud, embezzlement, 
and tax evasion and sentenced to nine years in prison in May 2005.163 
The Russian Federation brought new charges against them in February 
2007 resulting in further convictions in December 2010.164 
The respondent maintained that its law enforcement actions were 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory law enforcement measures undertaken in 
compliance with Russian law in response to illegal acts committed by 
Yukos’s executives and shareholders.165 Furthermore, the respondent 
argued that the treatment of Mr. Khodorkovsky, Mr. Lebedev, and 
other individuals was mostly irrelevant in the context of the investor-
state dispute because the ECT protections cover investments, not 
physical persons. Hence, the respondent argued its law enforcement 
actions did not impair the claimants’ investments.166 
While the Tribunal noted that “it is not a human rights court,” the 
arbitrators nevertheless found themselves competent to “consider the 
allegations of harassment and intimidation as they form part of the 
factual matrix of Claimants’ complaints that the Russian Federation 
violated its obligations under . . . the ECT.”167 The Tribunal then 
considered the conduct of criminal investigations, and the searches 
and seizures involving Yukos’s executives, employees, lawyers, and 
160 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 17, 
1998). 
161 Yukos, No. AA 227, Final Award, ¶¶ 1, 10, 63, 110. 
162 Id. ¶¶ 5, 81, 83, 761. 
163 Id. ¶ 82. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. ¶¶ 81, 83–86, 763. 
166 Id. ¶¶ 764, 795, 1556. 
167 Id. ¶ 765. 
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advisers, as well as the arrest and trial of Mr. Khodorkovsky.168 The 
Tribunal then proceeded to scrutinize the credibility of the claimants’ 
allegations about the campaign of harassment.169 The arbitrators 
concluded that the respondent’s actions were not justified as legitimate 
law enforcement measures: 
The Tribunal accepts that the Russian Federation had the power to 
conduct searches and seizures in Yukos’ premises during the ongoing 
criminal investigations. Nevertheless, having reviewed the record, 
the Tribunal finds that the investigation of Yukos was carried out by 
the Russian Federation with excessive harshness. Respondent’s 
counsel acknowledged that in the context of the large-scale fraud 
investigation “not everything is pretty in those circumstances, and 
we may each of us have circumstances that we would regret or 
have done differently.” The Tribunal considers “not pretty” to be 
an understatement in this case. The treatment of Yukos senior 
executives, mid-level employees, in-house counsel, external lawyers 
and related entities as described in this chapter support Claimants’ 
central submission that the Russian authorities were conducting a 
“ruthless campaign to destroy Yukos, appropriate its assets and 
eliminate Mr. Khodorkovsky as a political opponent.”170 
Having reviewed the evidence, the Tribunal decided that the 
respondent’s aggressive law enforcement actions significantly affected 
Yukos’s management, disrupted its operations, contributed to its 
demise, and thus damaged the claimants’ investment.171 Ultimately, the 
arbitrators concluded that “the primary objective of the Russian 
Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos and 
appropriate its valuable assets,”172 thus, the respondent had breached 
the non-expropriation guarantee under the ECT.173 While the Tribunal 
was primarily concerned with the USD $13 billion VAT assessments 
against Yukos and the auction of Yukos’s major subsidiary at a 
significantly deflated price,174 there is no doubt that overzealous 
conduct of criminal investigations played a role in the finding of 
liability. 
In Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, the dispute concerned the bailout of Bank 
Century, a banking institution indirectly owned by the claimant in 
168 Id. ¶¶ 766–93. 
169 Id. ¶¶ 795–804. 
170 Id. ¶ 811. 
171 Id. ¶¶ 819–20. 
172 Id. ¶¶ 756, 1579. 
173 Id. ¶¶ 1579–85. 
174 Id. ¶ 1579. 
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November 2008, and the subsequent criminal investigation and 
prosecution of the claimant.175 In December 2010, an Indonesian court 
held a trial in absentia and convicted the claimant of theft, corruption, 
and money laundering, and confiscated his assets.176 In August 2011, 
Al-Warraq commenced arbitration proceedings under the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Agreement.177 Al-Warraq alleged, 
inter alia, that the respondent breached the claimant’s basic rights 
under Article 14 of the ICCPR178 by prejudging his guilt, pursuing the 
criminal investigation for nefarious motives, failing to inform him 
about the nature and cause of the criminal charges, failing to properly 
summon him to attend the criminal trial, trying him in absentia, barring 
him from being represented by counsel, and not allowing him to appeal 
the conviction.179 The claimant argued that throughout the criminal 
investigation and prosecution, the respondent committed a number of 
procedural irregularities and corrupt practices and imposed arbitrary 
and discriminatory measures that impaired his investment.180 Thus, the 
respondent breached its obligation to accord fair and equitable 
treatment to the claimant’s investment.181 The claimant also alleged 
that the respondent’s pre-bailout measures amounted to expropriation 
and that the illegal conduct of the respondent’s investigatory and 
prosecutorial authorities breached the claimant’s right to adequate 
protection and security.182 
In the context of the claimant’s expropriation claim, the Tribunal 
concluded that the words “basic rights” in Article 10(1) of the OIC 
Agreement183 are properly understood as a reference to “basic property 
175 Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 88, 96–98, 108–09, 123–25 
(Dec. 15, 2014). 
176 Id. ¶¶ 139–41, 161. 
177 Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among Member 
States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, June 5, 1981 (entered into force Sept. 
23, 1986) [hereinafter OIC Agreement]. 
178 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
179 Al-Warraq, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 10, 177, 184–93, 202, 206–07, 213, 217–
18, 224–28, 238–39, 247–50. 
180 Id. ¶¶ 391–92. 
181 Id. ¶¶ 391–92. 
182 Id. ¶¶ 291, 427–30, 622. 
183 OIC Agreement, supra note 177, art. 10(1) (“The host state shall undertake not to 
adopt or permit the adoption of any measure—itself or through one of its organs, institutions 
or local authorities—if such a measure may directly or indirectly affect the ownership of the 
investor’s capital or investment by depriving him totally or partially of his ownership or of 
all or part of his basic rights or the exercise of his authority on the ownership, possession or 
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rights,” and not as a general reference to civil and political rights such 
as the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR.184 
Furthermore, because the adequate protection and security obligation 
covers only the investment, not the investor personally, the Tribunal 
found the respondent’s measures that affected the claimant’s due 
process rights, without any detrimental effect to the investment, could 
not result in a breach of this standard of protection.185 Because the 
criminal investigation and prosecution of the claimant occurred after 
the bailout, these actions did not deny adequate protection and security 
to the investment.186 
The Tribunal, however, also examined the alleged breaches of the 
claimant’s rights under the ICCPR as part of his fair and equitable 
treatment claim.187 The arbitrators concluded that the respondent had 
failed to properly examine the claimant and inform him of the criminal 
charges, and the conduct of the claimant’s trial in absentia contravened 
Article 14 of the ICCPR and Indonesian law.188 Ultimately, although 
the Tribunal held that the claimant’s trial and conviction in absentia 
amounted to a denial of justice and a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard,189 the claimant’s “unclean hands” rendered his 
claims inadmissible.190 
Another case decided in 2014, Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic,191 also 
involved the banking sector. The dispute concerned conduct of the 
Kyrgyz National Bank and Kyrgyz prosecutors, which began in April 
2010. Namely, the conduct involved the imposition of a temporary 
administrative regime in Manas Bank (in which the claimant was the 
sole shareholder), criminal investigations into money laundering, and 
other criminal offenses allegedly committed by the claimant, his bank, 
utilization of his capital, or of his actual control over the investment, its management, 
making use out of it, enjoying its utilities, the realization of its benefits or guaranteeing its 
development and growth.”). 
184 Al-Warraq, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 521–22. 
185 Id. ¶ 629. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. ¶¶ 522, 556–621. 
188 Id. ¶¶ 581, 584, 588, 601–05, 621. 
189 Id. ¶¶ 618, 621 (“Failure to comply with the most basic elements of justice when 
conducting a criminal proceeding against an investor amounts to a breach of the investment 
treaty.”). 
190 Id. ¶¶ 645–48. 
191 Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic, No. AA 518, PCA Case Repository, Award, ¶¶ 2–7 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014). 
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and its employees.192 The claimant alleged, in particular, that the 
criminal investigations instituted by the respondent breached the fair 
and equitable treatment standard and the prohibition of unreasonable 
interference with the investment as provided for in the Latvia-Kyrgyz 
Republic BIT.193 
The Tribunal found that the applicable BIT required the FET to be 
accorded to “investments of investors of either contracting party” and 
did not encompass the host state’s treatment of the former directors or 
managers of Manas Bank.194 The arbitrators thus decided that they 
lacked authority to “consider the criminal proceedings, however 
abusive they may be, in its analysis under the FET standard . . . except 
insofar as they form a pattern which may be relevant in assessing the 
context as a whole.”195 Instead, the Tribunal inquired whether the 
respondent’s measures were unreasonable or discriminatory and 
whether those measures impaired the claimant’s ability to manage his 
investment.196 On the one hand, the Tribunal acknowledged that it 
could not award damages to the former Manas Bank officials, who 
were not investors within the meaning of the applicable BIT,197 and that 
the respondent, a sovereign state, was “of course entitled to charge the 
Claimant with a violation of any crime they have the evidence to 
support.”198 On the other hand, the arbitrators affirmed that persistent 
pursuance of groundless criminal investigations constitutes a breach of 
the BIT: 
Criminal allegations pursued against the Claimant in the absence of 
evidentiary support (or even cogent explanations) infringe on his 
rights to enjoy the benefits of his investment. A particular enjoyment 
of property is the right to be associated with that investment. Where 
that association is improperly characterised as criminal, the 
impairment is evident. The perfunctory but persistent allegations 
against the Claimant have curtailed his ability to manage his 
investment. 
. . . . 
Where such criminal proceedings have consequences of depriving 
the investor of the management, use, and enjoyment of property, then 
the BIT requires that the underlying charges not be “unreasonable, 
discriminatory or arbitrary”. [sic] The Tribunal recalls that Kyrgyz 
192 Id. ¶¶ 4–9, 50–54, 122, 126–34. 
193 Id. ¶ 216. 
194 Id. ¶ 245. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. ¶¶ 246, 261–62, 267–72. 
197 Id. ¶ 267. 
198 Id. ¶ 271. 
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courts have twice remanded the case against the Claimant back to the 
Kyrgyz prosecutor. Further, the Respondent has not provided 
evidence to this tribunal of money laundering committed by Mr. 
Belokon, nor has it provided the reasoning of the prosecutor’s office 
that justified the criminal proceedings. Whether under Kyrgyz law or 
under international law, Mr. Belokon has a right to know the case 
against him. The conclusion in light of the record is inescapable, to 
the effect that his investment was arbitrarily destroyed and that 
compensation is accordingly due.199 
Ultimately, the Tribunal awarded the claimant USD $15 million, 
deciding that the respondent had indirectly expropriated Manas Bank 
by imposing a number of arbitrary and unjustified administrative 
measures, failing to accord FET to the claimant’s investment, and 
acting in a manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable manner.200 
This arbitral award was, however, subsequently set aside in 
France.201 The Court of Appeal emphasized that prohibition of money 
laundering is part of French international public policy. Further, while 
the Court was not called upon to decide the criminal liability of Mr. 
Belokon, it ruled that recognition and enforcement of this arbitral 
award would violate international public order in a “manifest, effective 
and concrete” way because of the circumstances in which the claimant 
acquired its investment in the Kyrgyz bank.202 And although criminal 
proceedings remained pending in the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Mr. Belokon has not been convicted of any crime, the French Court 
was persuaded by state evidence that Mr. Belokon acquired Manas 
Bank by virtue of his close ties with the Kyrgyz authorities in order to 
conduct “money laundering operations that could not have flourished 
in the less favourable Latvian environment.”203 
199 Id. ¶¶ 270, 272. 
200 Id. ¶ 335. 
201 Nataliya Barysheva & Valentine Chessa, Kyrgyz Republic v. Mr. Belokon, Court of 
Appeal of Paris, 21 February 2017, A Contribution by the ITA Board of Reporters, 
WOLTERS KLUWER, http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/document/kli-ka-ons-17-25-005 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2020). 
202 Id. 
203 Damien Charlotin, BIT Award Against Kyrgyzstan Is Annulled in Paris, with Court 
Giving Weight to Money-Laundering Allegations That Had Earlier Failed to Persuade 
Arbitrators, INV. ARB. REP. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/bit-award 
-against-kyrgyzstan-is-annulled-in-paris-with-court-giving-weight-to-money-laundering
-allegations-that-had-earlier-failed-to-persuade-arbitrators/.
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V 
ISDS AS A SYSTEM OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Overall, the global investment regime privatizes, denationalizes, and 
decentralizes cross-border investment and thus “transnationalizes” the 
investor-state dispute settlement.204 Philip Jessup articulated this 
conception of transnational law more than sixty years ago,205 in a series 
of lectures that anticipated the ways in which globalization forces 
“break the frames” of the historic unity between law and state.206 
Transnational relations are often defined as “regular interactions across 
national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state actor,”207 and 
Claire Cutler suggests that the “transnational is, ontologically and 
epistemologically, not a level of analysis, distinct from the national or 
domestic levels,” but “extends across and thereby links as well as 
transcends, different (territorial) levels,” and brings together local and 
global orders through privatized dispute resolution procedures.208 
Similarly to Philip Jessup, Harold Koh views transnational law as a 
“hybrid body of private and public, domestic and international law”209 
involving a multiplicity of public and private legal actors and sources 
of law.210 What makes transnational law unique, according to Harold 
Koh, is 
its melding of two conventional modes of litigation that have 
traditionally been considered distinct. In traditional domestic 
litigation, private individuals bring private claims against one another 
204 Human Rights Promotion, supra note 61, at 17, 20. 
205 PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (defining “transnational law” as “all 
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers . . . . [and includes] 
[b]oth public and private international law . . . . [in addition to] other rules which do not 
wholly fit into such standard categories.”). 
206 A. Claire Cutler, Legal Pluralism as the “Common Sense” of Transnational 
Capitalism, 3(4) OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 719, 723 (2013) (Spain) [hereinafter 
Common Sense]; Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the 
Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5(2) EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 199, 206 (2002) (U.K.). 
207 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction, in 
BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC 
STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 3–7 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 
1995); Human Rights Promotion, supra note 611, at 20. 
208 Human Rights Promotion, supra note 611, at 20 (quoting Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 
Theorizing the Transnational: A Historical Materialist Approach, 7(2) J. INT’L RELS. & 
DEV. 142, 144 (2004)). 
209 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2349 
n.9 (1991) [hereinafter Transnational Public Law Litigation]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Transnational Law Matters, 24(4) PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 745, 745 (2006).
210 Common Sense, supra note 206, at 725. 
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based on national law before competent domestic judicial fora . . . In 
traditional international litigation, nation-states bring public claims 
against one another based on treaty or customary international law 
before international tribunals of limited competence.211 
This Article analyzed four different approaches to investment 
arbitration as a form of global governance; each of these positions looks 
through a different lens at the way arbitrators decide investor-state 
disputes. HIL critics are likely to emphasize North-South inequalities 
in investment relations; GAL scholars may prioritize the need for 
greater transparency, accountability, and democratic participation in 
investment arbitration; new constitutionalism scholars warn that an 
investment protection regime imposes quasi-constitutional binding 
constraints on host states’ freedom to regulate; and advocates of 
humanity’s law would argue for greater consideration of human rights 
norms in interpreting IIAs.212 This Article also discussed arbitral 
jurisprudence on the interaction between protecting foreign investment 
and states’ power to conduct criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
Ultimately, this jurisprudence evidences several trends that highlight 
the role of investment arbitration as a system of global governance. 
First, while tribunals have repeatedly noted that they do not play the 
role of a human rights court,213 arbitrators have nevertheless regularly 
accepted competency to rule on allegations of mistreatment and 
harassment in the context of criminal investigations and prosecutions 
where such actions significantly affected investors’ ability to manage 
or benefit from their investments.214 Arbitrators have readily applied 
human rights norms, such as the provisions of the ICCPR,215 in 
assessing the treatment of investors or those sufficiently close to them. 
In other words, investment tribunals are willing to act as quasi-human 
rights courts for capital exporters. Paradoxically, both HIL critics and 
211 Transnational Public Law Litigation, supra note 209, at 2348. 
212 Global Governance, supra note 30, at 160. 
213 See, e.g., Ahmonseto, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/15, 
Award, ¶ 262 (June 18, 2007) 23:2 ICSID Rev. 352 (2008); Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of 
Man) v. Russia, No. AA 227, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, ¶ 765 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2014). 
214 See Ahmonseto, ¶¶ 255, 262; Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic, No. AA 518, PCA Case 
Repository, Award, ¶¶ 270, 272 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014); Rompetrol Grp. N.V. v. Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶¶ 151, 200 (May 6, 2013); Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 133 (July 26, 2007); Yukos, No. AA 227, PCA Case 
Repository, ¶ 765. 
215 See, e.g., Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 556, 621 (Dec. 15, 
2014). 
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humanity’s law advocates may invoke this trend in support of their 
theoretical positions. The former would emphasize the danger that 
investment arbitration may insulate wealthy individuals from 
legitimate law enforcement and thus hinder the fight against crime and 
corruption in developing countries. The latter, however, would see such 
cases as a sign that investment arbitration is becoming more receptive 
to human rights arguments and may serve as a mechanism to advance 
human rights, at least with respect to the interaction between foreign 
investors and host states’ coercive law enforcement apparatus. 
Second, tribunals create a quasi-constitutional framework for the 
exercise of states’ power to prosecute and investigate crimes. While 
arbitrators have repeatedly acknowledged that every state is entitled to 
exercise this sovereign power,216 arbitral tribunals have also formulated 
limits on the manner in which states enforce their criminal laws. For 
instance, the Tribunal in Al-Warraq v. Indonesia set out the following 
framework for the conduct of criminal trials in absentia: 
The Tribunal agrees with the Claimant that, for the extreme measure 
of trial in absentia to be permissible under international law, the 
Respondent must provide evidence that the Claimant: 
1) was notified of the trial, i.e. proper service of process;
2) had unequivocally and explicitly waived his right to be
present at trial;
3) had the legal right to be represented at trial and that he was
actually represented;
4) is able subsequently to obtain from a court which has heard
him a fresh determination of the merits of the charge.217
Also, in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, the Tribunal pointed out that 
repeatedly opening and closing criminal proceedings is irreconcilable 
with general principles of due process,218 and in Rompetrol v. Romania 
the arbitrators found that the “legitimacy of a criminal investigation 
cannot depend on the source from which the responsible investigating 
authority receives the information leading it to suspect that criminal 
offences may have been committed.”219  
216 See, e.g., Belokon, No. AA 518, PCA Case Repository, ¶ 271; Gustav F. W. Hamester 
GmbH v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 297 (June 18, 2010); 
Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, ¶ 278; Yukos, No. AA 227, PCA Case Repository, 
¶ 811. 
217 Al-Warraq, ¶ 595. 
218 Tokios Tokelés, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶ 114. 
219 Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, ¶ 232. 
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Furthermore, in Rompetrol v. Romania, the Tribunal expressly stated 
that foreign investors have a legitimate expectation that the host state 
would engage in a balancing exercise, weighing the public goal of 
investigating crime against the private investor’s interests and seeking 
to “avoid any unnecessarily adverse effect on those interests or at least 
to minimise or mitigate the adverse effects.”220 Similarly, in Yukos 
Cases, the arbitrators found that “the investigation of Yukos was 
carried out by the Russian Federation with excessive harshness.”221 
Taken together, these cases support the new constitutionalism theory 
that investment arbitration puts quasi-constitutional limits on the 
exercise of sovereign power. 
Third, the tribunals have maintained that applying domestic criminal 
law norms to a particular set of facts or assessing whether the domestic 
law enforcement authorities had probable cause to charge an individual 
is outside the tribunals’ jurisdiction.222 Neither should the tribunal 
function as a court of final review for a host state’s criminal justice 
system;223 however, tribunals have found that a host state committed a 
breach of the applicable IIA where the respondent pursues criminal 
allegations against the investor “in the absence of evidentiary support 
(or even cogent explanations)”224 or fails to provide “any document that 
would enable [the tribunal] to determine the merits of this criminal 
proceeding.”225 Similarly, in Hamester v. Ghana, the claimant did not 
satisfy the burden of proof because, considering certain documents 
submitted to the tribunal, the criminal proceedings did “not appear, 
prima facie, to have lacked a foundation.”226 The standard of review 
for a host state’s decision to commence a criminal investigation thus 
appears to be cursory, akin to a patently unreasonableness standard, 
where the host state is required to establish only that it had some 
reasonable basis to put coercive state apparatus in motion. These cases 
might point to investment arbitration being a species of GAL, although 
220 Id. ¶ 278. 
221 Yukos, No. AA 227, PCA Case Repository, ¶ 811. 
222 Rompetrol, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, ¶¶ 174, 233, 237–38. 
223 Id. ¶¶ 174, 233, 238. 
224 Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic, No. AA 518, PCA Case Repository, Award, ¶ 270 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014). 
225 S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/77/2, Award, ¶ 148 (Aug. 8, 1980) 8 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 144 (1983). 
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“administration” here refers to the administration of criminal justice 
rather than issuance of permits or licenses. 
In conclusion, arbitral jurisprudence confirms that tribunals readily 
accept the role of a private authority tasked with reviewing the exercise 
of such an inherently public function as enforcement of criminal 
law by sovereign states. Such review is limited in scope as the inquiry 
is limited only to the actions that significantly impair the management 
or other enjoyment of the investment by the investor. Further, the 
burden is rather high as the investor is required to demonstrate that the 
host state’s law enforcement actions in the conduct of a criminal 
investigation or prosecution were manifestly without merit, excessively 
harsh, or amounted to a campaign of harassment. Regardless, the 
exercise of this power by arbitral tribunals, i.e., panels of private 
individuals, has potentially long-reaching implications for state 
sovereignty and democratic accountability. 
